Judge Denies Immunity b/c Randolph County Cops Should Have Known It was Unlawful to Violently Bust Out Black Woman’s Driver Side Window and Yank Her Through the Broken Glass By Her Hair

From [HERE] The 4th US Circuit Court of Appeals will allow a woman to proceed with her federal excessive-force lawsuit against three Randolph County sheriff’s deputies. Appellate judges ruled Thursday against granting the deputies immunity from the suit.

The court’s opinion noted the “obvious illegality” of the “outrageous conduct” alleged in the suit.

Ka’Lah Martin’s complaint stemmed from a February 2019 traffic stop “that turned violent and culminated in her arrest,” wrote Judge Robert Bruce King for the unanimous 4th Circuit panel.

Martin was driving a $600 car that “had some issues,” in King’s words. She could open neither the front doors nor windows. When a Randolph County sheriff’s deputy attempted to stop Martin for failing to display a registration plate, she slowed her speed from 65 miles per hour to 30  mph and turned on her hazard lights. Martin drove for nearly six miles before turning off the road.

When she did pull over, there were multiple deputies, who approached with guns drawn. Martin had her hands raised and tried to tell the deputies that her car's front doors and windows did not work, but they smashed her driver's side window, grabbed her by the hair and arms, pulled her out without removing her seat belt, and threw her on the asphalt,

Martin received no medical attention to the cuts and scrapes resulting from being pulled through the broken window until she was released from jail and went to a doctor herself. [MORE]

She was arrested and charged with fleeing to elude arrest, operating a vehicle with no insurance and driving without a license plate. The charges later were dismissed. [MORE]

Martin filed suit in November 2021. Among her claims were excessive-force violations by deputies Travis Short, Kyle Gabby, and Jeremiah Harrelson. Each deputy claimed qualified immunity. The trial court rejected that defense and ruled that the excessive-force claims should proceed to trial.

“[W]e underscore that the appellants present the district court’s factual recitation in a way that actually favors them over plaintiff Martin in several respects,” King wrote. “For example, the appellants would have us rule that their use of force was reasonable based on the evidence that Martin continued to drive for 5.7 miles after appellant Short initiated his patrol car’s emergency lights and that Martin needed no more than a band-aid, Ibuprofen, and muscle relaxers for injuries sustained during her arrest.”

“Concomitantly, the appellants would have us diminish and outright disregard evidence tending to refute any threat that otherwise might be inferred from Martin’s continued driving (such as the evidence that Martin slowed her vehicle significantly and turned on the vehicle’s hazard lights), as well as evidence suggesting that any lack of more serious injuries was simply a matter of luck (i.e., the evidence that the appellants busted out the driver’s side window, forcibly pulled Martin through the broken window by her hair and arm, and then placed her face down on the roadway),” King added.

“At bottom, when we view the facts in the light that is truly most favorable to plaintiff Martin, we cannot conclude either that the appellants did not contravene her Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable seizure or that the right was not clearly established at the time of her arrest,” King concluded.

 “Indeed, we are convinced that — when, as Martin alleges happened, the appellants violently busted out the windows of her vehicle and yanked her through the broken driver’s side window by her hair and arm — every reasonable officer would have understood that what he was doing was unlawful, whether by then-existing precedent or by the otherwise obvious illegality of that outrageous conduct,” King wrote.

Chief Judge Albert Diaz and Judge Harvie Wilkinson joined King’s opinion.

Election Psyopsy: Only 1 Person is Actually Running for President but Dumbocrats in a State of 'Mazement' Believe Otherwise Despite Evidence to the Contrary [there are Only False Choices in the FRP]

How do you persuade a populace to embrace totalitarianism, that goose-stepping form of tyranny in which the government has all of the power and “we the people” have none?

According to FUNKTIONARY:

psyopsy – performing an analysis of what caused one who is mentally dead and culturally comatose to reach such a state or fate. Psyopsies can be performed only on the living dead. Those who are living another’s script (“reality”) are candidates.

Hobson’s Choice – you can either get with this or nothing at all. (See: Volition, Deschooling & Free Will)

maze – a fortified network of oversimplified logics and programmed attachments with strong emotional charges (connected to the attachments) severely hampering one in achieving lasting satisfaction from Life and clarification in Life. In a state of a ‘mazement’ learning is suspended and experiences which need to be assimilated are repressed. The cheddar-chasers say: “Don’t bother me, I know what I have to do to get what I want.” You would be amazed to learn how simple (not easy) it is to escape the smoke alarm reaction filled haze of the mighty maze. 2) a system of interconnecting multicursal pathways replete with blind alleys, twists and turns, false choices and unknown exit points often designed to confuse or confound the traveler. Mazes can be used to spiral through the rungs of our evolution in consciousness both infinitely extendable and expandable. (See: Cementality, Meditativeness, BLYND, Generalizations, Absolute Truth, Psylence, Critical Thought, Me-Bot, Understanding, Logic, Identifications, Mindful Witnessing, Souljourn, Consciousness, Clarity & Neuralasticity)

delusion – perceiving our personal experience as the ultimate reality. The delusion is not in the experience, but our existential orientation to it within our mind. There is no absolute way or fixed method to dismantle or dissipate your delusions, for they are myriad and legion when the primary delusion is running your spiritual operating system, i.e., the delusion of duality. However, there are a few approaches that address the Catch-22 of delusion. Aptly noted in the Quran surah 3:185 “…And what is the life of this world except the enjoyment of delusion.” All other delusions stem from this master delusion—the Template of Duality. “When one person suffers from delusion, it’s called insanity. When many people suffer from delusion, it is called religion.” ~Robert Pirsig. Delusion, by its very nature, is quite obscure. When we’re deluded, we don’t know we’re deluded. This is what I refer to as “Bignorance.” Those unaware are unaware of being unaware. Even delusion itself exists already within the freedom of the Self. (See: Ghosts, The Self, The Sky, Illusion, Physical World, “Me,” Ego, Appropriate Attention, The World, “Bignorance,” Mastar, Religion, HOE, Beacon, The World, Template of Duality, SOS, Separate Self, Suffering, Identification, Authority, Perception, Explanation, Impressions, Identities, Attachment, Fear, Thinking, Religion, Reductionism & Passing Show)

Old Dumb MF Can Barely Talk During the ‘Great Rerate:’ Elites and Their Dependent Media Clown the Public by Trying to Prove They Can Get Sheeple to Elect Anyone They [s]Elect, Even a Corpse

According to FUNKTIONARY:

voting hoax - "Help Slave America." "We would do well to remember that voting is often a way not of consenting to something, but only of expressing a preference. If the state gives a group of condemned prisoners the choice of being executed by firing squad or by lethal injection, and all of them vote for firing squad, we cannot conclude from this that the prisoners thereby consent to being executed by firing squad. They do, of course, choose this option; they approve of it, but only in the sense that they prefer it to the other option. They consent to neither option, despising both. Voting for a candidate in a democratic election sometimes has a depressingly similar structure. The state offers you a choice among candidates (or perhaps it is "the people" who make the offer), and you choose one, hoping to make the best of a bad situation. You thereby express a preference, approve of that candidate (over the others), but consent to the authority of no one." --A. John Simmons. (See: Taxtortion, Freedom Technology, Ph.F. Degree, NOW, The Matrix, MEDIA, Elections & University of Chocolate City).

Still No Charges in Chicago Cops' Massacre of Dexter Reed, Shot 96X After Unlawful Stop. Amended Complaint says Cops Continued Shooting Unarmed Black Man as he Exited Car and as He Laid in the Street

On April 24, 2024, the family of Dexter Reed and their attorneys filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the City of Chicago and Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers Alexandra Giampapa, Thomas Spanos, Victor Pacheco, Gregory Saint Louis and Aubrey Webb, who fatally shot Reed during a traffic stop in West Side neighborhood Humboldt Park. [MORE] On June 4, 2024 they amended their complaint. It states,

On March 21, 2024, CPD officers targeted Dexter during a predatory, violent, unlawful traffic stop that ended with Defendant Officers shooting Dexter 96 times in 41 seconds. One Defendant Officer continued to shoot at least three bullets into Dexter’s body as he lay unarmed, lifeless, and bleeding out on the street. Rather than attempt to provide Dexter with lifesaving aid, Defendant Officers handcuffed Dexter’s arms behind his lifeless body and then walked away. Eventually, Dexter was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.

Police in an unmarked vehicle stopped Dexter by sideswiping his car without any forewarning or orders to stop. The police officers involved were not wearing uniforms - they wore hoodies and failed to identify themselves as they aggressively stormed Dexter’s car, surrounding him with their guns drawn as they barked commands at him, to enforce an unknown traffic violation.

Although prosecutors clearly have probable cause to charge for murder and the entire crime was captured by cameras, no cops have been charged with any crime - 3 months after the fact.

The complaint states,

“Next, while wearing hoodies, jeans, and other casual clothing, they brandished their weapons in a threatening manner, screamed curse words at Dexter, and attempted to unlawfully enter his vehicle. Defendant Officers unlawfully pointed their guns at Dexter, thus escalating the situation and exponentially increasing the risk of death for everyone—Dexter, Defendant Officers, and bystanders alike. Then, Defendant Officers used wildly disproportionate force against Dexter—repeatedly shooting at him even when he clearly presented no threat. Finally, Defendant Officers ignored Dexter as he was handcuffed and bleeding out on the street. In those critical minutes, Defendant Officers refused to attempt to provide him with any lifesaving aid.”

TARGETING ALL BLACKS. According to the complaint, “Dexter’s death is also directly attributable to CPD’s longstanding practice of engaging in unlawful traffic stops. CPD officers routinely target Black drivers on Chicago’s south and west sides for minor traffic violations. The large scope and persistent unlawfulness of CPD’s Mass Traffic Stop Program has most recently been documented by the Free to Move Coalition2 and in a class action complaint filed by the ACLU of Illinois.3 Free to Move’s data analysis concluded that Black drivers comprised 51.2% of people pulled over despite Black people making up less than 30% of the city’s residents.4 In contrast, over 32% of Chicago's population is white, and 13.6% of stops by CPD were of white drivers.5 CPD officers in the 11th District—where Defendant Officers stopped Dexter—conduct more traffic stops than almost anywhere else in the City. Most of CPD’s traffic stops focus on minor non-moving violations that are unrelated to safety. This data provides further evidence that most CPD traffic stops since 2016 have been pretextual.

The specific allegations are as follows:

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

I. CPD’s UNLAWFUL MASS TRAFFIC STOP PROGRAM TARGETS THE WESTSIDE OF CHICAGO.

25. As described in detail below, CPD operates an unlawful Mass Traffic Stop Program. For at least half a century, CPD has implemented police programs characterized by high-volume stops of Black and Latino people based on low-level violations that CPD uses as excuses to harass, surveil, and intimidate Black and Brown Chicagoans.18

26. CPD operates its Mass Traffic Stop Program with particular force on the Westside of Chicago, where the Defendant Officers unlawfully stopped, detained, and eventually shot at Dexter Reed at least 96 times. CPD officials have repeatedly affirmed that officers should conduct traffic stops “where violent crime occurs.”19 There is, however, no correlation between CPD’s Mass Traffic Stop Program and violence prevention. Fewer than 1% of CPD traffic stops recover contraband. The vast majority of CPD’s traffic stops are not made for “offenses indicating dangerous driving behavior and the stops did not produce evidence of criminal activity.”20

27. CPD officers conduct 22% of all traffic stops in the 11th District and the surrounding area—but only 6% of Chicago’s drivers live in this area. 21

28. CPD’s Mass Traffic Stop Program imposes quotas on CPD officers. CPD internal emails reveal that over a period of several years, 11th District CPD Supervisors repeatedly demanded Tact Team Members report, focus on, and increase pretextual traffic stops.22 On the day they encountered Dexter, Defendant Officers operated pursuant to CPD’s Mass Traffic Stop Program and attempted to achieve the quotas imposed upon them by District 11 supervisors.

II. DEFENDANT OFFICERS CONDUCTED AN UNLA WFUL, PRETEXTUAL STOP OF DEXTER REED.

29. On the evening of March 21, 2024, at approximately 6:00 PM, Dexter drove his recently purchased white SUV on Ferdinand Street, in the City of Chicago. The weather was clear and it was still daylight. Dexter stopped his vehicle at a red light at the intersection of Hamlin and Ferdinand, facing westbound. When the light turned green, Dexter drove through the intersection and traveled westbound onto the 3800 block of West Ferdinand. Another vehicle traveled westbound, immediately behind Dexter. Dexter traveled within the speed limit and complied with the stop sign at the next intersection, Ferdinand and Avers Ave.

30. On the same date and time, Defendants CPD Officers and Tact Team members Alexandra Giampapa, Thomas Spanos, Victor Pacheco, Gregory Saint Louis, and Aubrey Webb patrolled District 11 in an unmarked, silver SUV. Defendant Officer Webb drove the vehicle.

31. While Dexter drove onto the 3800 west block of Ferdinand, Defendant Officers’ vehicle was south of Dexter, stopped at a red light.

32. After both Dexter and the vehicle traveling immediately behind Dexter traveled through the intersection of Hamlin and Ferdinand, Defendant Officer Webb approached and ran through a red light at the intersection of Hamlin and Ferdinand, turning left onto Hamlin. Video footage demonstrates Defendant Officers made the decision to target Dexter merely three seconds after his vehicle came in their line of sight.

33. Defendant Officer Webb accelerated his unmarked car to pass the vehicle traveling immediately behind Dexter. Defendant Webb then pulled the unmarked CPD vehicle alongside Dexter’s vehicle and angled it as if to sideswipe Dexter’s car. This maneuver forced Dexter to stop his car just past the northwest corner of Ferdinand and Avers Ave. Defendant Webb used this vehicle maneuver to unlawfully detain Dexter.

34. West Ferdinand Street, between Hamlin and Avers—where Defendant Officers stopped Dexter’s car—is a residential area, populated by numerous single and multiunit family dwellings, with green space and wide sidewalks for community members to enjoy.

35. Each named Defendant Officer completed a Tactical Response Report documenting Defendant Officers’ initial justification for engaging with Dexter. Those reports state Defendant Officers pulled Dexter over incident to a “traffic stop.” Defendant Officer’s reports affirms that, at the time they targeted Dexter, Defendant Officers had no information to suggest Dexter had committed any serious or violent offense. The reports further affirm Defendant Officers targeted Dexter pursuant to CPD’s Mass Traffic Stop Program.

36. Surveillance camera footage reflects that Defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to suspect Dexter of any traffic violation. Defendant Officers had no legal justification to target, stop, and detain Dexter.

37. After evaluating available video evidence regarding this traffic stop, Andrea Kersten, the Chief Administrator of the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (“COPA”) wrote to CPD Superintendent Snelling documenting concerns with the Defendant Officers’ credibility and justification for stopping Dexter. Specifically, “COPA is uncertain how the officers could have seen this seat belt violation given their location relative to (Reed’s) vehicle and the dark tints on (his) vehicle windows. . .This evidence raises serious concerns about the validity of the traffic stop that led to the officers’ encounter with (Reed).

III. DEFENDANT OFFICERS UNLAWFULLY POINT FIREARMS AT DEXTER AND ENGAGE IN ESCALATORY CONDUCT DURING THE UNLAWFUL STOP.

38. After Defendant Officers unlawfully curbed Dexter’s vehicle, they engaged in a number of violent, threatening, and ultra-aggressive policing tactics intended to confuse and to create chaos. Defendant Officers screamed conflicting commands at Dexter, brandished batons in a threatening manner, used disrespectful and profane language, unlawfully attempted to enter his vehicle, and pointed their weapons at Dexter’s face without legal justification.

39. Defendant Officer Giampapa exited the unmarked CPD SUV from the back passenger side. She was un-uniformed and wore a hoodie and blue jeans. Defendant Officer Giampapa did not announce herself as a police officer, nor did she advise Dexter why he had been stopped.

40. Instead, Defendant Giampapa aggressively demanded “Roll the window down, roll the window down. What are you doing?” Dexter complied and completely rolled down his front driver’s side window. In response to Defendant Officer Giampapa’s question, Dexter stated that he was doing “nothing.”

41. Defendant Officer Giampapa then ordered Dexter to roll down his other windows. Body camera footage suggests Dexter became flustered and, in an effort to comply with Defendant Officer Giampapa’s commands, mistakenly partially rolled up the driver's side window instead of rolling down the vehicles’ other windows. The fact that Dexter had committed no violation, but was still subject to Defendant Officers’ aggressive threats undoubtedly created confusion and panic for Dexter.

42. After Dexter’s window rolled partially up, Defendant Officer Giampapa commanded Dexter “do not roll the window up.” At the same time, Defendant Officer Giampapa unholstered her firearm and pointed it at Dexter’s face. While she pointed her gun at Dexter, she attempted to open the driver’s side door of Dexter’s vehicle. Defendant Officer Giampapa unreasonably pointed her gun at Dexter within seconds after she approached his vehicle

43. With her gun pointed at Dexter’s face, Defendant Officer Giampapa continued yelling, screaming repeatedly “Open the doors now!” Dexter replied “Okay, Okay I’m trying.” Defendant Giampapa never acknowledged Dexter’s words and never inquired whether his window had malfunctioned or if his door was jammed. Instead, she continued screaming at him with her gun aimed at him.

44. Defendant Officer Saint Louis, who was un-uniformed wore a hoodie pulled up over his head and jeans. Defendant Officer Saint Louis did not announce himself as a police officer nor did he advise Dexter why he had been stopped.

45. Defendant Officer Saint Louis exited the unmarked CPD vehicle from the front passenger’s seat and approached the front passenger side of Dexter’s vehicle at the same time Defendant Giampapa approached Dexter on the driver’s side. Defendant Officer Saint Louis approached Dexter with an extended baton in his raised hand and immediately ordered Dexter to roll down his passenger side window and commanded “Put your ... put your window down, man,” “Hey roll this one down too... Hey, unlock it!” Seconds after he approached the vehicle, Defendant Officer Saint Louis pointed his gun at Dexter, cocking his wrist and aiming the weapon at Dexter through the windshield.

46. Defendant Officer Pacheco was un-uniformed, wearing khaki pants and a baseball cap. Defendant Officer Pacheco did not announce himself as a police officer nor did he advise Dexter why he had been stopped and curbed.

47. Defendant Officer Pacheco exited the unmarked SUV from the back passenger side and approached the driver’s side of Dexter’s vehicle. Immediately after exiting CPD’s vehicle, Defendant Officer Pacheco pointed his firearm at Dexter and began screaming "Do not f---'g roll it up. . .Unlock the f---'g door.”

48. Defendant Officer Spanos was un-uniformed, and dressed in a hoodie, khakis, and a knit cap. Defendant Officer Spanos did not announce himself as a police officer nor did he advise Dexter why he had been stopped and curbed.

49. Defendant Officer Spanos exited the unmarked SUV from the back driver’s side and approached the driver’s side of Dexter’s vehicle. Standing just a few feet from Dexter’s vehicle. Defendant Officer Spanos immediately unholstered and pointed his gun at Dexter and yelled “Put both hands up!”

50. CPD policy prohibits officers from pointing their firearms at a person unless objectively reasonable to do so.24

51. CPD’s Use of Force Policy General Order 03-02 provides that officers will “use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force. . .” The Policy further provides de-escalation techniques include providing a “warning and exercising persuasion and advice prior to the use of force” and determining whether the situation could be “stabilized through the use of time, distance and positioning.” The Policy also requires that CPD officers “treat all persons with courtesy and dignity which is inherently due every person and will act, speak, and conduct themselves in a courteous, respectful, and professional manner.” Finally, the Policy prohibits officers from using force unless it is the “minimum amount of force needed to provide for the safety of any person.”

52. Defendant Officers surrounded Dexter and failed to identify themselves as police officers or to explain why they conducted the aggressive, pretextual stop and trapped him in between the curb and a parked car. Defendant Officers then each unholstered and pointed their guns at Dexter at close range and screamed various and conflicting commands at him, with several of them repeatedly and forcefully pulling on his car doors and trying to get inside his vehicle. Defendant Officers’ actions created a confusing and chaotic environment and placed Dexter in objective fear for his safety, and at risk of great bodily harm. None of the Defendant Officers engaged in any type of de-escalation. Instead, they pointed their weapons at Dexter and used profane language in clear violation of CPD policy.

53. CPD’s Use of Force Policy General Order 03-02 imposes on CPD officers an affirmative obligation to intervene when they observe a use of force that is “excessive or otherwise in violation” of CPD policy. The Policy instructs officers to “verbally intervene” to stop a violation.

54. From the driver’s side of the CDP vehicle, Defendant Officer Webb observed Defendant Officers Giampapa, Saint Louis, Pacheco, and Spanos engage in the escalatory and unlawful conduct described above. In clear violation of CPD policy, Defendant Officer Webb took no action to intervene or deescalate.

55. By pointing their firearms at Dexter during a minor traffic stop and otherwise escalating this encounter as detailed above, Defendant Officers Giampapa, Saint Louis, Pacheco and Spanos engaged in an unreasonable use of force. By observing these unlawful actions and failing to take action, Defendant Officer Webb violated his duty to intervene.

IV. DEFENDANT OFFICERS DEMONSTRATED A GROSS DISREGARD FOR THE SANCITY OF HUMAN LIFE WHEN THEY SHOT DEXTER REED 96 TIMES IN 41 SECONDS AND FIRED BULLETS INTO DEXTER’S MOTIONLESS BODY.

56. Defendant Chicago Police Officers Giampapa, Pacheco, Spanos, and Webb unloaded a barrage of bullets at Dexter while he was inside his vehicle. At some point either before or after the Defendant Officers Giampapa, Pacheco, Spanos, and Webb began shooting at Dexter, Defendant Officer Saint Louis sustained a gunshot injury when a bullet grazed his wrist.25

57. After Defendant Officers Giampapa, Pacheco, Spanos, and Webb shot their weapons at Dexter for approximately 27 seconds, firing approximately 83 shots, Dexter exited his vehicle, unarmed, with hands empty and raised in sign of surrender. At this point, Dexter posed no threat of imminent harm.

58. After observing Dexter exit his vehicle, the Defendant Officers Giampapa, Pacheco, Spanos, and Webb failed to provide Dexter with any commands or warnings. Nor did any of these Defendant Officers attempt to engage in any de-escalation. Instead, they continued to shoot at Dexter in a reckless, out-of-control manner demonstrating a complete disregard for Dexter’s humanity.

59. After Dexter exited his vehicle, unarmed and with his hands empty, Defendant Officers Giampapa, Spanos, and Pacheco moved closer to Dexter.

60. Defendant Officer Giampapa shot additional bullets at Dexter.

61. Dexter collapsed to the ground at the rear of his vehicle. His head slammed into the street and lay unmoving and face down, with his head under the rear of his vehicle.

62. At this point, Defendant Officers Giampapa, Pacheco, Spanos, and Webb took no action to determine if Dexter was alive. Nor did they make any effort to secure him medical assistance.

63. Instead, Defendant Officers Spanos and Pacheco continued to shoot at Dexter even as he lay motionless, face down in the street.

64. Even after Dexter fell to the street, Defendant Officer Spanos paused his shooting, and then fired an additional three shots at Dexter’s body as he lay face down and motionless on the street.

65. Ultimately, Defendant Officers Giampapa, Pacheco, Spanos, and Webb shot 96 bullets at Dexter 41 seconds after they first encountered him.

66. In the letter to Superintendent Snelling, based on a review of relevant video evidence, COPA Chief Kersten documented “grave concerns about [Defendant Officers Giampapa, Pacheco, Spanos, and Webb’s] ability to assess what is a necessary, reasonable, and proportional use of deadly force.”26

67. CPD’s Use of Force Policy G03-02 instructs officers that CPD’s “highest priority is the sanctity of human life. In all aspects of their conduct, Department members will act with the foremost regard for the preservation of human life and the safety of all persons involved.” This Policy further provides that officers must continually “assess the situation and modify[] the use of force as circumstances change.”27

68. In violation of CPD written policy and applicable law, Defendant Officers Giampapa, Pacheco, Spanos, and Webb used grossly disproportionate force against Dexter when he clearly presented no threat to the officers.

69. Defendant Officer Spanos demonstrated a gross disregard for the sanctity of human life when he continued to fire his weapon at Dexter’s motionless body, even after the other Defendant Officers ceased firing.

V. DEFENDANT OFFICERS FAILED TO PROVIDE DEXTER WITH ANY LIFE SAVING MEASURES AS HE LAY BLEEDING OUT ON THE STREET.

70. None of the individual Defendant Officers provided any life-saving measures to Dexter after they had shot 96 bullets at him, striking him multiple times. Instead, Defendant Officers Giampapa, Pacheco, Spanos, and Webb left Dexter lying face down on the City street with his head under his vehicle as he bled out.

71. After the shooting stopped, Defendant Giampapa approached Dexter as he lay in the street with one shoe missing. Blood poured from his head and pooled on the street. Despite Dexter’s obvious and urgent medical needs, Defendant Officer Giampapa called for an ambulance for Defendant Officer Saint Louis, but never communicated Dexter’s need for care.

72. Instead, Defendant Officer Giampapa repeatedly screamed at Dexter “don’t move, don’t move, don’t f---’ing move!” When Defendant Giampapa was just a few feet from Dexter she stated “he’s still breathing.” Defendant Officer Webb responded “we need EMS here now! We need EMS here now!” At this point both Defendant Officers Giampapa and Webb realized Dexter was still alive and in need of urgent medical attention. But neither Defendant Officers Giampapa nor Webb took any action to provide Dexter with any lifesaving care.

73. Defendant Officer Giampapa continued to move closer to Dexter, while repeatedly screaming “hey don’t f--’ing move! Do not f--’ing move!” When she was close enough to touch Dexter Defendant Officer Giampapa stated repeatedly “I don’t know where the gun is.” She attempted to issue commands to Dexter, stating “hey dude, let go of the gun” as she pulled Dexter’s left hand out from underneath body. Simultaneously, Defendant Officer Webb pulled Dexter’s right hand out from underneath his body. Dexter’s hands were empty. There was no gun in his possession or near his body. After confirming Dexter did not have a gun in his hands, Defendant Officers Webb and Giampapa walked away from Dexter. At no time did they provide him with lifesaving aid.

74. Officer John Doe 1 aided by Officer John Doe 2 took over for Defendant Officers Webb and Giampapa and placed handcuffs on Dexter.

75. After Dexter was handcuffed, another John Doe Officer exclaimed, “I don’t know where it is”— seemingly in reference to a weapon the officers suspected Dexter of possessing. In response, Officer John Doe 1, walked away from Dexter, walked in a circle around Dexter’s vehicle, CPD’s vehicle and other parked vehicles and explained to a fellow officer that he is “trying to find a gun.”

76. While Officer John Doe 1 attempted to “find a gun,” Officer John Doe 2 stood over Dexter’s body. Neither Officer John Doe 1 nor Officer John Doe 2 provided Dexter with any lifesaving aid.

77. In sharp contrast, while Defendant Officers ignored Dexter’s obvious and urgent medical needs, multiple CPD officers surrounded and provided aid to Defendant Officer Spanos who was—in his own words: “ok, [but] just freaking out.” After reloading his weapon three times and shooting Dexter dozens of times, blood was splattered on Defendant Officer Spanos’ pants. When he realized his pants were blood stained, Defendant Officer Spanos exclaimed plaintively to other CPD officers “these are my favorite pants.”

78. Seconds later, Defendant Officer Spanos approached Dexter while he was laying on the street, bleeding out. He observed Officers John Does 1 & 2 standing over Dexter while failing to provide him with any lifesaving aid. Defendant Officer Spanos took no action to provide Dexter with aid nor did he encourage any Officers John Does to do so.

79. Eventually, other CPD officers who arrived at the scene, immediately provided Dexter with chest compressions and other potentially lifesaving aid. Their efforts came too late to save Dexter. He was pronounced dead later that day.

80. CPD Special Order S11-10-03 provides that every CPD member—including each Defendant—receive training in Law Enforcement Medical and Rescue Training, often referred to as LEMART. LEMART instructs CPD officers on the use of four lifesaving implements: (1) tourniquets to stop arterial bleeding; (2) combat gauze containing a hemostatic agent that can stop bleeding in seconds; (3) chest seals that prevent air from entering the chest cavity of gunshot victims; and (4) pressure bandages to stop bleeding. A reasonable police officer who has training about and access to these implements would use them to attempt to save the life of any gunshot victim.

81. CPD General Order 03-02 provides that CPD officers are required to “immediately request appropriate medical care for [an] injured person” and guides officers to provide medical care consistent with their training to any individual with visible injuries.

82. Defendants Officers Giampapa, Pacheco, Spanos, Webb, and Officer John Does 1 and 2 had access to the lifesaving implements described above and training on how to use them. Despite this fact, these Defendants refused to provide care to Dexter and further failed to request appropriate medical care for Dexter “as soon as it was safe and practicable” in violation of CPD policy and the law.

ACLU says Pervasive Mass Traffic Stops are "Urgent Problem" in Chicago as Cops Arbitrarily Interfere w/Black Peoples Freedom of Movement. An Increase of 90,000 to 500,000 Stops a Year from 2016-2023

From [HERE] Five Black and Latino Chicago motorists, Plaintiffs and proposed class representatives in Wilkins v. City of Chicago et al.,are asking Chief Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer to block CPD from sidestepping their case by moving oversight of traffic stops in the city under the Consent Decree process that has moved at a “snail’s pace” due to CPD’s recalcitrance. Last month, after years of complaints and warnings about the CPD’s mass traffic stop program, the federal court overseeing the consent decree set a public hearing on Tuesday, June 11th for testimony about “what specific traffic stop-related requirements should be added to the Consent Decree, if any.” 

The Court order follows a hearing in October 2023 in which the issue of including traffic stops under the consent decree was publicly discussed. There was no indication at that time how the decree would address the problems of discriminatory traffic stops or what steps would address the issue, and several community members testified that they preferred other mechanisms for fixing CPD’s traffic stop practices.  In the intervening months, there was no indication that the parties in the consent decree were working to move traffic stops under the decree process.  

The Wilkins plaintiffs have a clear and distinct interest in how the issue of discriminatory traffic stops is addressed and reformed, leading to today’s filings.  

“As our clients have made clear in their complaint, discriminatory traffic stops are an urgent problem in Chicago,” said Alexandra Block, director of the Criminal Legal System and Policing Project at the ACLU of Illinois who represents the Wilkins plaintiffs. “More than a half million Chicago motorists, mostly Black and Latino, are being stopped each year with no benefit to public safety. Moving oversight under the consent decree – without a transparent plan for immediate and accountable transformation of CPD’s practices and policies – does not meet the community’s need for urgent change.”  

The request to intervene in the consent decree process comes as another federal judge has ruled that the Wilkins case may move forward. Judge Mary Rowland largely denied the City’s motion to dismiss the case and held that the Wilkins Plaintiffs can proceed on their claims that the mass traffic stop program violates their rights under the federal Equal Protection Clause and the Illinois Civil Rights Act. The Court found that the Wilkins Plaintiffs presented sufficient facts to show that the City intentionally discriminated against Black and Latino drivers on the basis of race, and that the mass traffic stop program unlawfully burdens Black and Latino drivers disproportionately.  

The Wilkins lawsuit alleges that CPD officers are more likely to pull over Black and Latino drivers than white drivers, flooding neighborhoods on the South and West Sides of the City with traffic stops for alleged minor equipment and registration violations. The issue of racially discriminatory traffic stops in Chicago has been reported publicly for years. The number of traffic stops has grown astronomically in recent years, from fewer than 90,000 in 2015 to more than 500,000 in 2022 and 2023.  Data shows that since 2016, Black drivers in Chicago have been 4 to 7 times more likely than white drivers to be stopped by police; Latino drivers have been twice as likely to be stopped as white drivers. The data presented also shows Chicago police are also far more likely to search Black and Latino drivers and their vehicles, even though the police often have higher rates of finding illegal contraband in the vehicles of white drivers.

While CPD has consistently failed to address this problem – even as the number of stops increased dramatically – Superintendent Snelling publicly responded to the release of video footage of CPD officers shooting a Black driver, Dexter Reed, ninety-six times during a pretextual traffic stop by calling for traffic stops to be brought under the consent decree. CPD could have unilaterally ended its program of pretextual stops, but did not do so. 

The Wilkins plaintiffs have asked the court overseeing the consent decree to allow them to participate in proceedings to determine whether the consent decree should be modified so they are not crowded out of any discussions about ways to end CPD’s mass traffic stop program.  The Wilkins plaintiffs are represented by the ACLU of Illinois and the law firm Arnold & Porter.

The Wilkins plaintiffs also note that CPD has not used the consent decree process to make real changes since the final Consent Decree was entered in January 2019.  The most recent Monitor report about progress under the decree shows that the City has fully met its requirements in only 7% of the Decree’s provisions. Moreover, CPD repeatedly has been called out by the Monitor for failing to engage the public in the reform process, a problem that would be exacerbated by cutting off the Wilkins clients from meaningful discussions on reform of the traffic stop program.  

“CPD has moved at a snail’s pace in making change under the Consent Decree – something which already frustrates members of the community across Chicago,” added Block. “It is simply unacceptable to allow their recalcitrance to be extended to traffic stops and to eliminate the voices of our clients in this process.”  

“We urge the court to ensure that our clients’ voices are heard in this process.”

UK Tests Emotion Recognition Cameras in Train Stations [coming soon to urban cities w/large Black/Latino Populations that are Controlled by elite white liberals]

From [HERE] For the last two years, British authorities have been testing AI-powered emotion recognition cameras on travelers in train stations, according to recently disclosed documents.

What can the cameras see?

In each of eight train stations around the UK, five to seven cameras or sensors scan the passing crowds. Using AI software from Amazon, the cameras use object recognition algorithms to spot criminal activity, trespassing, weapons, wet floors, overcrowding, and overstuffed trash cans. 

They can also alert authorities when passengers engage in “unusual behavior,” such as shouting, running, smoking, or skateboarding. 

A combination of existing cameras and newly installed smart cameras are being used for the surveillance project. All are equipped with Amazon’s Rekognition surveillance system.

Emotional recognition

Through a combination of facial and behavioral analyses, the Rekognition software allows officials to also analyze visitors’ emotions. Internal documents note that the cameras can detect whether a passenger is “happy, sad [or] angry.” They can also recognize passenger satisfaction, which “could be utilized to maximum advertising and retail revenue.”

Anti-social behavior

Authorities can also detect passengers who exhibit “anti-social behaviour,” which according to London’s Metropolitan Police Service means “behaviour by a person which causes, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to persons not of the same household as the person.”

Social distancing, face masks, and demographics

Other use cases for the surveillance cameras include detecting whether passengers are keeping to social distancing rules and wearing face masks. The cameras can also scan for demographics by identifying people’s age profiles and “socio-economic classification,” which the documents note can create “revenue opportunities for better targeted advertising and product placement.”

Jury Finds MD Cop Guilty of Excessive Force for Peppering Spraying a Handcuffed Black Man After an Unlawful Stop and then Waiting Several Hours to Transport him to Jail. Faces 10 Years in Prison

From [HERE] A former police officer in Maryland was recently convicted for using excessive force during a traffic stop, a federal jury determined. Philip Dupree, 40, formerly with the Fairmount Heights Police Department was found guilty of one count of deprivation of rights under color of law, according to a statement from the U.S. Attorney's Office.

The announcement came from U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves, along with comments from Assistant U.S. Attorney General Kristen Clarke and FBI Assistant Director David Sundberg. Dupree, who now faces up to 10 years behind bars, will be sentenced at a later date with a particular consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and other statutory factors.

"We depend on law enforcement officers to protect our communities from crimes and to protect our civil rights while doing so," U.S. Attorney Graves said. Graves pointed out the breach of community trust that occurs when an officer such as Dupree "unjustly and unreasonably" uses their authority against citizens. The conviction stemmed from an incident on Aug. 4, 2019, where Dupree initiated a traffic stop on Eastern Avenue NE, just within the District of Columbia's border and allegedly without proper cause.

During the stop, Dupree's aggressive handling of the situation escalated to physical violence, even after the victim was handcuffed and placed in Dupree's personal vehicle. The encounter, much of which was captured on both body-worn camera footage and cell phone video by an eyewitness, showed Dupree pepper-spraying the restrained driver in the face and chest. Later, instead of following department policy to transport the victim to county lock-up, Dupree took the driver to the local station and reportedly fabricated a statement of Probable Cause claiming, the driver had attacked him.

Assistant Attorney General Clarke vehemently condemned Dupree's actions, stating, "Police brutality and violent misconduct against defenseless people are disgraceful acts that have no place in our society today." Similarly, FBI Assistant Director Sundberg reassured the public of the FBI's dedication to investigating such cases, emphasizing their commitment to protecting citizens' civil rights against law enforcement misconduct.

Dupree was arrested on August 24, 2022, in Washington D.C., following an investigation by the FBI Washington Field Office with the prosecution being led by Trial Attorney Sanjay Patel of the Civil Rights Division and Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher Howland for the District of Columbia. Details of Dupree's sentencing will be released upon scheduling by U.S. District Court Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly.

New Accusations of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Virginia Capital Case Emerge Three Years After State Abolishes Death Penalty

From [HERE] A June 2024 petition filed in the Prince William County, Virginia Circuit Court, accuses former Commonwealth Attorney (CA) Paul Ebert of withholding exculpatory evidence during the trial of Louis Jefferson Dukes Jr., who, along with his nephew Lonnie Weeks Jr., was convicted of murdering a state trooper in 1994 during a traffic stop. Mr. Dukes was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison, while Mr. Weeks was found guilty, received the death penalty, and was executed in 2000. In the petition filed with the circuit court, Mr. Dukes’ attorney alleges that CA Ebert made “material misrepresentations” in court when the prosecution claimed that serology reports established Mr. Dukes’ proximity to the state trooper when he was killed. The petition states that “the commonwealth’s attorney knew this was not the victim’s blood on [Mr. Dukes’] jacket,” despite his arguments regarding proximity. Richard MacDowell, an attorney for Mr. Dukes, alleges that CA Ebert also made a deal with Mr. Dukes’ cellmate that included a promise to seek a reduced sentence in exchange for testimony in Mr. Dukes’ case. 

Throughout his more than 50 years in office, CA Ebert secured 13 death sentences, placing Prince William County, Virginia, on the list of top death penalty jurisdictions. Despite his success securing death sentences, courts have found several other instances in which CA Ebert and his office withheld exculpatory material in capital cases. In 2009, CA Ebert was criticized for withholding evidence in the case of John Allen Muhammad, but the Court decided the evidence would not have altered the trial’s outcome. Just two years later, citing evidence that CA Ebert’s office once again withheld evidence, U.S. District Judge Raymond A. Jackson overturned the capital conviction of Justin Wolfe, holding that crucial impeachment evidence was withheld from the defense. Upholding Jude Jackson’s ruling, the appeals court wrote that because of the earlier ruling in Mr. Muhammad’s case, CA Ebert’s office should “err on the side of disclosure, especially when a defendant is facing the specter of execution.”

Supreme Court Ruling Weakens Protections for Poor Defendants Sentenced to Death

From [HERE] In a 6-3 decision on May 30, the Supreme Court deviated from its own precedent and practice to uphold an Arizona man’s death sentence despite a federal appellate court ruling that his trial lawyer was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

Danny Jones was accused of killing three people during an attempted theft in 1992. Arizona prosecutors sought the death penalty. Mr. Jones, who said his drug use led to the offense, could not afford to hire an attorney. A public defender who had been an attorney for only about three years and had never been a lead attorney on a capital case was assigned to represent him.

A long line of precedent flowing from the Court’s 1986 decision in Strickland v. Washington establishes that defense attorneys have a constitutional duty to investigate and present evidence of mitigating circumstances to the sentencer in a capital case.

But Mr. Jones’s lawyer did not investigate potential mitigation evidence until after the jury had already convicted him of capital murder. He never hired a mental health expert and failed to request neurological or neuropsychological testing until the day of the sentencing hearing, even though he knew that Mr. Jones was “oxygen-deprived at birth and had a lithium deficiency—a condition linked to serious psychiatric disorders” and that “he was medicated for mood disorders, had attempted suicide and had been admitted to a mental hospital,” Courthouse News reports.

Mr. Jones was sentenced to death. On appeal, he argued that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed his death sentence, finding that the public defender’s performance was deficient and there was a reasonable probability that Mr. Jones would not have been sentenced to death if his lawyer had presented available evidence about his mental health. [MORE]

FBI Violated Hundreds of Americans' Constitutional Rights & Lied About It

In 2021, FBI agents lied to a judge, got permission to raid safe-deposit boxes owned by people suspected of no crime, and then sent hundreds of forfeiture notices never saying what the box owners did wrong. Then they lost the contents of many of the boxes, including retirees' entire life savings. But don't take our word for it. Head over to The Los Angeles Times(link is external) and see the FBI agents admit as much under oath.

Violent Crime Drops As Gun Ownership Continues to Climb

From [HERE] New FBI data for the first quarter of 2024 shows violent crime dropped by more than 15 percent from the same period last year, at a time when U.S. gun ownership has continued to rise, and the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms says this is more evidence widespread gun ownership is not the cause of crime.

“More guns in the hands of law-abiding citizens is probably a deterrent,” said CCRKBA Chairman Alan Gottlieb. “Recent data shows a 6.7 percent increase in gun ownership between 2017 and 2023, and during that period, gun ownership among women went up 13.6 percent.”

According to an FBI announcement:

“A comparison of data from agencies that voluntarily submitted at least two or more common months of data for January through March 2023 and 2024 indicates reported violent crime decreased by 15.2 percent. Murder decreased by 26.4 percent, rape decreased by 25.7 percent, robbery decreased by 17.8 percent, and aggravated assault decreased by 12.5 percent. Reported property crime also decreased by 15.1 percent.”

“This is a significant report,” Gottlieb stated, “because it literally destroys a myth that has been perpetuated for years by the gun prohibition lobby, that more guns results in more violent crime. Today, 29 states have passed laws eliminating the need for permits to carry firearms for personal protection, yet crime is down. More than 21 million Americans are licensed to carry, according to the most recent available data, suggesting they aren’t a problem, but might be part of the solution.”

The data covers the months of January through March. Attorney General Merrick Garland noted this new data on the decline in homicide “does not represent abstract statistics.” The declines in violent and property crime have been seen in every region of the country.

“What this report shows is that blaming lawful gun ownership for violent crime is a non-starter, and it always has been,” Gottlieb said.

Supreme Ct Says the Govt Can Permanently Revoke a Persons Gun Rights Automatically w/o Due Process or a Hearing Based on a Hearsay Finding by a Civil Court that 'He Might Commit a Crime in the Future'

“RIGHTS” OR FAVORS FROM A MASTER? Supreme Ct Manipulates 2nd Amendment Test to Disarm People.

The US Supreme Court on Friday upheld a federal law barring gun ownership for individuals who have been subjected to domestic violence restraining orders by a civil court. Under the contested federal law in the case, the government automatically revokes an individual’s 2nd Amendment rights as a direct consequence of a finding that a person might commit a crime in the future. Thereafter, If a person violates the court order the government again automatically revokes their gun rights permanently as a direct consequence, without a hearing. [MORE]. Under Court’s holding, the individual need not be charged or arrested for the dangerous conduct and the judicial finding that ‘a person might commit a crime’ can be made at informal hearings based on hearsay and relaxed evidentiary rules with notice to the individual as the only Due Process protection.

Elites and their media are very pleased with the result.

In 2020, Zackey Rahimi and his ex-girlfriend, C. M., entered into a qualifying civil restraining order. C. M. had requested the order and asserted that Rahimi assaulted her. Because the order found that Rahimi presented a credible threat and prohibited him from using physical force against C. M., the order automatically triggered §922(g)(8)’s firearms ban. A year later, officers discovered firearms in Rahimi’s home. Rahimi pleaded guilty to violating §922(g)(8).

In 2022 the Supreme Court held in NY v Bruen that any law which infringes on an individual’s 2nd Amendment right is presumptively invalid and must be struck unless it is consistent with the nation’s tradition of firearm regulation. A law consistent with the nation’s tradition of firearm regulation ‘is analogous to laws that existed at the time the 2nd Amendment was ratified and is a law that was “well established and representative” at the time.’ Nevertheless, in the new case the court rationalized that because surety laws, which merely fined people for domestic violence, existed at the time of the 2nd Amendment and because laws also existed that provided minor punishment for committing public affrays (violence in public) at the time of the 2nd Amendment, it could therefore uphold the federal domestic violence law as passing Constitutional muster. That is, the Court found traditional surety laws and affrays laws to be analogous to the federal domestic violence law despite the fact that the domestic violence law revokes gun rights permanently and carries felony punishment as opposed to a mere fine provided by surety laws and despite the fact that affrays laws were concerned with public violence/terror, not interpersonal violence such as domestic violence. Despite the lack of similarity to traditional laws existing at the time of the 2nd Amendment, the court inexplicably said the domestic violence passed the Court’s test. In the lone dissent Justice Thomas warned: ‘In short, laws targeting “dangerous” persons led to the Second Amendment. It would be passing strange to permit the Government to resurrect those self-same “dangerous” person laws to chip away at that Amendment’s guarantee.” He wrote,

“This case is not about whether States can disarm people who threaten others. States have a ready mechanism for disarming anyone who uses a firearm to threaten physical violence: criminal prosecution. Most States, including Texas, classify aggravated assault as a felony, punishable by up to 20 years’ imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§22.02(b), 12.33 (West 2019 and Supp. 2023). Assuming C. M.’s allegations could be proved, Texas could have convicted and imprisoned Rahimi for every one of his alleged acts. Thus, the question before us is not whether Rahimi and others like him can be disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. Instead, the question is whether the Government can strip the Second Amendment right of anyone subject to a protective order—even if he has never been accused or convicted of a crime. It cannot. The Court and Government do not point to a single historical law revoking a citizen’s Second Amendment right based on possible interpersonal violence. The Government has not borne its burden to prove that §922(g)(8) is consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.“

The law at issue, 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8) makes it unlawful for an individual who is subject to a civil restraining order to possess firearms or ammunition. To trigger §922(g)(8)’s prohibition, a restraining order must bear three characteristics. First, the order issues after a hearing where the accused “received actual notice” and had “an opportunity to participate.” §922(g)(8)(A). Second, the order restrains the accused from engaging in threatening behavior against an intimate part- ner or child. §922(g)(8)(B). Third, the order has either “a finding that [the accused] represents a credible threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner or child,” or an “explici[t] prohibit[ion]” on “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against [an] intimate part- ner or child.” §922(g)(8)(C). If those three characteristics are present, §922(g)(8) automatically bans the individual subject to the order from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” §922(g).

Just as important as §922(g)(8)’s express terms is what it leaves unsaid. Section 922(g)(8) does not require a finding that a person has ever committed a crime of domestic violence. It is not triggered by a criminal conviction or a person’s criminal history, unlike other §922(g) subsections. See §§922(g)(1), (9). And, §922(g)(8) does not distinguish contested orders from joint orders—for example, when parties voluntarily enter a no-contact agreement or when both parties seek a restraining order.

In addition, §922(g)(8) strips an individual of his ability to possess firearms and ammunition without any due process. Rather, the ban is an automatic, uncontestable consequence of certain orders. See §922(g) (“It shall be unlawful for any [qualifying] person [to] possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition”). There is no hearing or opportunity to be heard on the statute’s applicability, and a court need not decide whether a person should be dis- armed under §922(g)(8). The only process §922(g)(8) re- quires is that provided (or not) for the underlying restraining order.

Despite §922(g)(8)’s broad scope and lack of process, it carries strong penalties. Any violation of §922(g)(8) is a felony punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment. §924(a)(8). And, a conviction for violating §922(g)(8) itself triggers a permanent, life-long prohibition on possessing firearms and ammunition. See §922(g)(1).

Thomas stated that the law clearly violated the 2nd Amendment guarantee and the court “cobbled together” so-called “evidence” that the law was consistent with the nations tradition of firearms regulations - as the laws basis cited by the court were not relevant to the statute at issue. Specifically, laws preventing “dangerous persons” from possessing guns were historically aimed at quashing treason and rebellion - not domestic violence. Also affray laws concerned public affrays or crimes in public that terrorize the public. Such laws did not prohibit carry arms in public for self-defense or possessing arms at home. Additionally, although surety laws addressed interpersonal violence, the violation of surety laws did not permanently revoke rights and were not punishable as a felony- they only imposed a civil fine and kept gun rights intact. Thomas explained,

“Critically, a surety demand did not alter an individual’s right to keep and bear arms. After providing sureties, a person kept possession of all his firearms; could purchase additional firearms; and could carry firearms in public and private. Even if he breached the peace, the only penalty was that he and his sureties had to pay a sum of money. To disarm him, the Government would have to take some other action, such as imprisoning him for a crime.”

As such, the court’s historical comparisons used to uphold the law were nonsensical. Justice Thomas stated,

The Court’s contrary approach of mixing and matching historical laws—relying on one law’s burden and another law’s justification—defeats the purpose of a historical in- quiry altogether. Given that imprisonment (which involved disarmament) existed at the founding, the Government can always satisfy this newly minted comparable-burden re- quirement. See ante, at 14–15. That means the Govern- ment need only find a historical law with a comparable jus- tification to validate modern disarmament regimes. As a result, historical laws fining certain behavior could justify completely disarming a person for the same behavior. That is the exact sort of “regulatory blank check” that Bruen warns against and the American people ratified the Second Amendment to preclude. 597 U. S., at 30.

The federal law at issue, 922(g)(8)’s has no requirement that the accused has actually committed a crime; instead, he need only be prohibited from threatening or using force, or pose a “credible threat” to an “intimate partner or child.” §922(g)(8)(C). Section 922(g)(8) thus revokes a person’s Second Amendment right based on the suspicion that he may commit a crime in the future.

In addition, the only process required before that revocation is a hearing on the underlying court order. §922(g)(8)(A). During that civil hearing—which is not even about §922(g)(8)—a person has fewer constitutional protections compared to a criminal prosecution for affray. Gone are the Sixth Amendment’s panoply of rights, including the rights to confront witnesses and have assistance of counsel, as well as the Fifth Amend- ment’s protection against double jeopardy. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U. S. 431, 441 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases”); Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 99 (1997) (“The [Double Jeopardy] Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense”). Civil proceedings also do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and some States even set aside the rules of evidence, allowing parties to rely on hearsay. See, e.g., Wash. Rule Evid. 1101(c)(4) (2024) (providing the state rules of evidence “need not be applied” to applications for protection orders (boldface and capitali- zation deleted)); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §527.6(i) (West Supp. 2024) (judge “shall receive any testimony that is rel- evant” and issue order based on clear and convincing evi-dence). The differences between criminal prosecutions and civil hearings are numerous and consequential.

Vermont Cops Terrorize Kids w/Surprise Mass Shooting Practice: 2 women ran into a Classroom, followed by a man wearing a ski mask holding a gun [false flaggots]. Then [fake] gunshot sounds rang out

From [HERE] Police in Burlington, Vermont, subjected a group of high school students to a mock shooting without warning, traumatizing teenagers who have been programmed to hide from — and even fend off — school shooters.

In a statement, the Burlington Police Department apologized Thursday for the “presentation” that it staged the day before at the police station.

“The roll-playing scenario only involved three department personnel simulating a robbery scenario and was not directed at any students or faculty,” the department wrote.

Local news outlet Seven Days reported that the simulation involved police personnel bursting into a room and pretending to open fire:

Two students who spoke on the condition of anonymity said the class was facing the front of the room listening to a detective speak when they heard screams from behind them. Two women ran in, the students said, followed by a man wearing a ski mask who was holding a gun. Then [fake] gunshot sounds rang out.

According to local NBC affiliate WPTZ, officials with the school district said teachers were aware that a firearm-related demonstration would take place to show how witness statements can be unreliable, but had not realized that it would happen “without warning.”

Choosing to perform a simulated shooting to teach students a lesson about eyewitness testimony is a baffling choice in itself, considering the very real threat of gun violence that Americans live with. In a time of loosening gun laws and too-frequent mass shootings, active shooter drills are commonplace in schools across the U.S., including in preschool.

Research has shown that such drills can have lasting mental health effects on children, even when there’s ample notice. Gun safety advocates say other school safety measures can be more effective in preventing gun violence — and far less traumatizing to students.

The Free Range Prison in US becoming More Like the Free Range Prison in China: DoGooders Beg Court to Liquidate InfoWars. Media Pretends Alex Jones Default Judgement is Proof that Sandy Hook Occurred

A bankruptcy judge approved the liquidation of the personal assets of Alex Jones on Friday, with proceeds expected to go toward the families of the so-called Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting victims.

At the same time, Judge Christopher Lopez with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Houston dismissed the chapter 11 case of Free Speech Systems, the owner of Infowars, siding with Jones, who said the dismissal would better serve the creditors and FSS employees.

The ruling punctuated a lengthy legal saga stemming from Jones’s alleged false statements that the 2012 school shooting was a government hoax. Courts in Texas and Connecticut found him liable by default for defaming the families of shooting victims who were subject to harassment and threats after his remarks. He owes more than $1 billion in defamation damages to the families of the alleged victims. [MORE]

The dependent media has mislead the public to believe that an actual trial took place and a jury made a factual finding that Jones made a false statements about Sandy Hook after examining evidence during a contested court case. Specifically, the media has mislead the public to believe that the families demonstrated with evidence that Sandy Hook actually took place and thereafter a court found Jones liable for defamation for stating otherwise. However, contrary to constant media mischaracterization, there were no actual contested trials. Rather, default judgements were made against Jones for his lawyers’ failure to provide documents and meet filing deadlines. No trial ever took place. Once a default judgment was made by the court the only thing left for the jury to do was to determine the amount of damages for the alleged defamation. Jones participated in that part of the proceeding. The court proceedings only pertained to how much should be awarded in damages.

A default judgment transforms a defending party’s admissions (which occur upon entry of the default) into a final judgment; it usually terminates the litigation by producing an enforceable, final award in favor of the pleader. When the damages amount is not a sum certain, the court may convene an evidentiary hearing- simply to determine damages, not the underlying claim which is deemed to have occurred through the default. Although the entry of default deprives the defaulting party of the right to contest most of the complaint’s factual allegations, that party may contest the amount of damages. The Dependent media has mischaracterized the hearing on damages as a “jury trial” in order to confuse the proceeding with an actual jury trial on the merits. [MORE]