From [HERE] In a closely watched decision stemming from the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot, the US Supreme Court ruled on Friday that the government must prove a defendant impaired or attempted to impair the availability or integrity of evidence to be convicted under a key obstruction statute. The statute has nothing to do with obstructing an event at the capitol.

On January 6, 2021, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered outside the US Capitol while Congress convened in a joint session to certify the 2020 Presidential election results in favor of Joe Biden. Amid escalating tensions, some protesters breached the Capitol, breaking windows and clashing with law enforcement, which resulted in a significant delay in the certification process.

The complaint alleges that Fischer was one of those who invaded the building.

According to the complaint, about an hour after the Houses recessed, Fischer trespassed into the Capitol and was involved in a physical confrontation with law enforcement. Fischer claimed in Facebook posts that he “pushed police back about 25 feet,” and that he “was inside the [Cap- itol] talking to police.” Id., at 193–194. Body camera foot- age shows Fischer near a scrum between the crowd and police who were trying to eject trespassers from the building.

A grand jury returned a seven-count superseding indict- ment against Fischer. Six of those counts allege that Fischer forcibly assaulted a federal officer, entered and re- mained in a restricted building, and engaged in disorderly and disruptive conduct in the Capitol, among other crimes. See id., at 181–185; 18 U. S. C. §§111(a), 231(a)(3), 1752(a)(1), (a)(2); 40 U. S. C. §§5104(e)(2)(D), (G). Those six counts carry maximum penalties ranging from six months’ to eight years’ imprisonment.

In Count Three, the only count before the court, the Government charged Fischer with violating 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(2). Fischer moved to dismiss that count, arguing that the provision criminalizes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court granted his motion in relevant part. It concluded that the scope of Section 1512(c)(2) is limited by subsection (c)(1) and therefore requires the defendant to “‘have taken some action with respect to a document, record, or other object.’

A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and re- manded for further proceedings. Judge Pan, writing for the court, held that the word “otherwise” in Section 1512(c)(2) means that the provision unambiguously covers “all forms of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding, other than the conduct that is already covered by §1512(c)(1).” 64 F. 4th 329, 336 (2023). Judge Walker concurred in part and concurred in the judgment because he read the mens rea element of the statute—“corruptly”—as requiring a defend- ant to act with “an intent to procure an unlawful benefit.” Id., at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted). The preceding section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1512(c)(1) establishes criminal liability for specific actions such as altering, destroying, or concealing records intending to obstruct official proceedings. Subsection 1512(c)(2) broadens this prohibition to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.”The Supreme Court was asked to weigh in on whether the expansive language of 1512(c)(2) should be tempered by the specific acts listed in 1512(c)(2).

Through statutory interpretation of the language of the statute and its legislative history and context, the Court ruled that 1512(c)(2)n had nothing to do with obstructing an official proceeding. Rather, 1512(c)(2) “was enacted simply to address the Enron accounting scandal disaster which dealt with the destruction of documents and other forms of evidence. [MORE]